Securing the Synthetic Workforce
Agentic platforms are moving from pilot to production: synthetic workers provisioned with credentials, tools, and objectives, operating at machine speed. The failure modes are no longer theoretical; credential leakage, prompt injection, and agents reasoning around restrictions have all been observed in live deployments. Outerlimit makes the unauthorised action structurally impossible, rather than merely detectable.
Improving policy does not ensure agent control
Credentials obscured at provisioning can still be extracted and surfaced in outputs. A credential issued for one purpose can be used in unintended environments or contexts. And natural-language instructions like "do not push this data to GitHub" are not enforceable: agents have been observed installing alternative libraries and converting sensitive data to new formats to route around the intended restriction entirely.
The agent never holds a credential
Outerlimit uses distributed encryption to fragment the original credential and bind that fragment cryptographically to the agent's provisioned identity. The agent never sees or uses a true credential, and no changes to your existing infrastructure or agents are required. The fragment itself is random noise, meaningful only in the context of the active policy and the agent's verified identity.
Tools that don't exist off-policy
Your execution environment is built on the Outerlimit base image, where the same distributed encryption is applied to individual executables and tools. Rather than removing access, which signals to the agent what's restricted, tools simply do not exist unless they decrypt successfully under the active policy. If an agent attempts to install or use an alternative to circumvent a restriction, the attempt is detected and blocked.
Full telemetry, framework agnostic
Every tool call and agent action is bound to telemetry at the execution layer, surfaced in the Outerlimit portal as behavioural analytics and anomaly detection, enabling security teams to trigger automated or manual shutdown where needed. None of it depends on your agent framework, orchestration layer, or harness: if an identity can be assigned at provisioning, the full enforcement stack operates without infrastructure changes.
